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INTRODUCTION

In several recent cases the United States Supreme Court found
certain state tax schemes to be unconstitutional.' The Supreme Court,

1. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987); American Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266 (1987).
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however, abstained from deciding whether its ruling should be applied retroactively 2 or whether the State should be required to pay
the taxpayers a refund. Rather, the Supreme Court decided that
these remedial issues would be better addressed if left to the states. 4
The right to a refund is ordinarily a matter of legislative grace.5
In other words, the right to a refund is procured only from a statute
authorizing such. 6 Thus, the state may choose, subject to minimum
federal requirements, 7 which form of remedy it will provide the taxpayer.8
Generally, when a state wrongfully or illegally imposes a tax,
the aggrieved party has several remedies available. 9 Arguably, the
most important remedy is an action at law to recover a refund of
the illegal taxes involuntarily paid.' 0 Prior to James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia," when a tax statute was found to be unconstitutional, courts were given latitude in determining whether their
decision invalidating the tax statute was to be given retroactive or
prospective effect.' 2 The mere fact that the statute was invalidated
on a prospective basis was considered, in a broad sense, a limited
3
form of remedy.'

2. This comment uses the root terms "retroactive" and "retrospective" interchangeably.
3. Philip M. Tatarowicz, Right to a Refund for Unconstitutionally DiscriminatoryState Taxes

and Other ControversialState Tax Issues Under the Commerce Clause, 41 TAx LAWYER 103, 117
(1987). See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 278; Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 253; Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 297-98.
4. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 278; Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 253; Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 297-98.
5. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 631 (1954). In Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920), the

United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution requires that a taxpayer be
given a refund if the taxpayer paid an unconstitutional tax under duress.
6. Tatarowicz, supra note 3, at 125. The state legislature, however, can only compel the refund
of taxes illegally collected. 84 C.J.S Taxation § 632 (1954).

7. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bev., 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2258 (1990).
8. Id. W. VA. CODE § 11-10-14 statutorily authorizes tax refunds and provides, in pertinent
part: "In the case of overpayment of any tax ... the tax commissioner shall, subject to the provisions
of the article, refund to the taxpayer the amount of the overpayment .... .
9. 72 AM. JUR. 2d State and Local Taxation § 1059 (1974).
10. Id. Other remedies include maintaining a suit in equity for injunctive relief against the
enforcement and collection of the illegal tax, and bringing a suit under proper averments by a stockholder to restrain a corporation from voluntarily paying an alleged illegal tax. Id.
11. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
12. Tatarowicz, supra note 3, at 119.
13. Id.
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It appears, however, that states will now be required to provide
retroactive relief in those cases where taxes were paid pursuant to
an unconstitutionally discriminatory tax scheme.14 In Beam, the
plaintiff requested and was denied a refund for taxes paid under
an unconstitutional liquor tax. In finding that Beam was entitled to
some form of retroactive relief, the Supreme Court completely disregarded the itemized analysis previously relied upon to determine
whether a judicial decision was to be given prospective or retroactive
effect.1 5 Instead, in what appears to fall just short of intellectual
dishonesty, the Supreme Court based its ruling on precedent established in a similar case which, too, had apparently erred in not
6
performing the traditional prospective/retroactive analysis.'
The Beam decision has the potential of significantly and adversely affecting a state's financial stability, because tax refunds represent revenue losses.17 Based on the Beam analysis, it now appears
that refunds will be required when taxes are paid pursuant to an
unconstitutionally discriminatory tax. In an effort to avoid paying
these refunds, states will probably advance two primary theories.
First, states will most likely continue to assert that a judicial decision
which invalidates a tax scheme should be applied on a prospectivebasis only.' 8 Not only has this strategy had some success in the past,' 9
but its potential for effectiveness in the future may not be as dismal
as the Beam decision would leave one to believe. The Beam Court
produced five opinions and the Supreme Court's decision may be
20
narrowly applied in subsequent cases.
Second, states will likely argue that the illegal taxes paid by business entities were passed on to the taxpayer's customers and that
any refund would amount to a windfall. This assertion is based on

14. Martin Lobel, Refunding UnconstitutionalState Taxes, 52 TAX NOTES 581 (July 29, 1991).
15. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
16. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).

17. Tatarowicz, supra note 3, at 117.
18. Id.
19. Penn Mutual Life Ins. v. Department of Licensing & Regulation of the State of Michigan,
412 N.W.2d 668 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); First of McAlester Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Commissioner,
709 P.2d 1026, 1036 (Okla. 1985); Salorio v. Glaser, 461 A.2d 1100, 1111 (N.J. 1983).
20. Lobel, supra note 14, at 581-83.
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the principle of unjust enrichment. 2' Application of the pass-on defense enables the states to keep possession of the monies collected
pursuant to the unconstitutional tax statute, 22 and effectively denies
the taxpayer a refund. This strategy, too, has seen some success.23
This Note begins with a brief overview of common law judicial
review. Then Part III examines the evolution of prospective overruling in the American judicial system and analyzes the Supreme
Court's decisions shaping this judicial mechanism. Part IV provides
a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court's ruling in James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.24 Part V examines the pass-on defense, discussing the development of the defense and its fundamental
component, the tax incidence analysis. Finally, Part VI provides a
summary of where it appears the Supreme Court stands on the issues
of retroactive relief when taxes are paid pursuant to an unconstitutional tax scheme and the pass-on defense.
II.

COMMON LAW JUDIIciAL REVIEW

There was no authority at common law that provided for a court's
ruling to be given a purely prospective effect; 2 all decisions were
applied retroactively. Indeed, Sir William Blackstone stated that the
courts were "not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain
and expound the old one." ' 26 Accordingly, Blackstone noted, in a
case where a former ruling is "evidently contrary to reason, ...
judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old
one from misrepresentation. "27 By virtue of this reasoning, all judicial rulings were necessarily given retroactive effect, regardless of
whether the court applied settled principles of law, overruled prior
decisions, or decided disputes upon which there was not clear precedent.
21. William J.Woodward, Jr., "Passing-On" the Right to Restitution, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV.
873, 877 (1985).
22. Id.
23. See Standard Oil Co. v. Bollinger, 169 N.E. 236 (I1. 1929); Shannon v. Hughes Co., 109
S.W.2d 1174 (Ky. 1937).
24. 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991).
25. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965).
26. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
27. Id. at *70.
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EVOLUTION OF PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING IN THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

As the people of a young America saw the world as one filled
with certainty, Blackstone's theory that laws were absolute and unchanging was readily adopted by America's judicial system. 28 In conformity with this expectation of consistency, American courts
endorsed the Blackstonian theory well into the 20th century. 29 It
seemed logical that a party who succeeded in convincing the court
that the old law should be abandoned should be rewarded by having
the new rule applied to his case.30 Today, there remain great legal
minds, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, who subscribe to the theory
that all judicial decisions are to be applied retroactively. 31 Concededly, most legal scholars will agree that Blackstone's theory is not
entirely invalid.32 Generally, courts apply Blackstone's theory of retroactive application because the court's ruling usually reflects pre33
existing rules and principles.
However, the problems with universal retroactive application of
judicial decisions were becoming abundantly apparent in the early
to mid-1900's. In 1932, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo 34 noted that
in some instances outmoded rules were sometimes continued because
the courts did not want to frustrate the reasonable expectations of
the parties before it. 35 Critics of the Blackstonian theory argued that
people who justifiably relied on the old law and conducted their

28. Thomas S. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA.
L. REv. 201, 206 (1965).

29. Cameron S. DeLong, Note, Confusion in Federal Courts: Application of the Chevron Test
in Retroactive-ProspectiveDecisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. Ray. 117, 120 (1985).
30. George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, United States Supreme Court's Views as to Retroactive
Effect of Its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1219, 1226 (1981).
31. In his concurring opinion in Beam, Justice Scalia stated, "I am not so naive (nor do I

think our forbears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it
as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it -

discerning what the law is,

rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be." James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, I11 S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (emphasis in original).

32. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreward:The High Court, The Great Writ and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HAuv. L. Ray. 56, 60 (1965).
33. Beam, I11 S. Ct. at 2442.

34. At the time, Cardozo was the Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court of Appeals.
Beryl H. Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1960).
35. Id.
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lives accordingly should not be subjected to a new law.36 Additionally, universal retroactive effect to judicial decisions overruling old
law imposes a heavy burden on the administration of justice by
allowing prior cases already decided to be relitigated.37
A.

The State's Choice
In 1932, the Supreme Court began bringing down the wall of
universal retroactive application of judicial decisions. In Great
Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 38 , the Supreme Court
ruled that there was not a Federal Constitutional objection to a state
court's choosing to apply its decision retroactively or prospectively
when the new rule declared by the state court overruled an earlier
decision. Speaking for the Sunburst Court, Justice Cardozo stated,
"[tihe choice for any state [in deciding to apply its decision retroactively or to prospectively overrule] may be determined by the
juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of
law, its origin and nature.' ' 9
B.

When a Court May Prospectively Overrule
The Supreme Court's approach to prospective overruling was
first formulated in Linkletter v. Walker.40 In deciding what effect
the new rule of law is to have, Justice Clark, writing the opinion
for the Linkletter Court, stated:
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited
from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard it
4
operation. '

36. DeLong, supra note 29, at 119.
37. S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Retroactive or Merely ProspectiveOperationof New Rule Adopted
by Court in Overruling Precedent Federal Cases, 14 L. Ed. 2d 992, 1005 (1966).
38. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Although Sunburst is generally acknowledged as the first case to
explicitly approve of prospective overruling, other state courts had done so earlier. See Levy, supra
note 34, at 7-9.
39. Sunburst, 287 U.S. at 365.
40. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See Ralph A. Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme
Court and the Problem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381 (1974).
41. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). As to prospective overruling, the Court
noted that there was "no distinction ...between civil and criminal litigation" in this respect. Id.
at 627.
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Once a court has balanced these equities it may, "in the interest
of justice," apply its ruling prospectively. 42 The Linkletter Court
noted that a court's power to prospectively overrule applies to both
criminal and civil cases. 43 Linkletter, however, did not establish satisfactory guidelines in this difficult and confusing area. 44 Indeed,
Justice Harlan noted that the Linkletter analysis was "almost as
difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search
45
of its intended victim.1

The Supreme Court revised its standard for prospective overruling in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.46 In Chevron, the Supreme
Court set forth the following considerations 47 in determining whether
a rule of law is to be applied retroactively:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle
of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed.... Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule
in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. . . ."4 Finally, we [must weigh] the inequity imposed
by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our
4
cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity. '9

42. Id.at 628.
43. Id.at 627.
44. Rossum, supra note 40, at 384.
45. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971).
46. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
47. This analysis will be referred to as the "Chevron analysis" or the "three prong analysis."
48. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
49. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979), the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, while recognizing the Chevron analysis, formulated its own test to determine whether
a decision should be given prospective or retroactive effect. The Bradley Court stated:
In determining whether to extend full retroactivity, the following factors are to be considered: First, the nature of the substantive issue overruled must be determined. If the issue
involves a traditionally settled area of law ... and the new rule was not clearly foreshadowed, then retroactivity is less justified. Second, where the overruled decision deals
with procedural law rather than substantive, retroactivity ordinarily will be more readily
accorded. Third, common law decisions, when overruled, may result in the overruling decision being given retroactive effect, since the substantive issue usually has a narrower impact
and is likely to involve fewer parties. Fourth, where, on the other hand, substantial public
issues are involved, arising from statutory or constitutional interpretations that represent a
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C. Judicial Mechanisms Available When a Decision is Overruled
Only when a prior court decision is overruled and succeeded by
a new rule of law may a court entertain assertions of nonretroactive
application of the new rule.50 In such a case, the Supreme Court
recently indicated that this choice of law problem may be resolved
in one of three ways. 5 1 First, the decision may be applied on a fully
retroactive basis.5 2 Second, the court may overrule old law on a
purely prospective basis.5 Finally, the court may apply the new rule
to the parties in the case in which it was announced, and then apply
the old rule to all others where the relevant facts of their case antedate the pronouncement.5 4 This judicial mechanism is called se55
lective prospectivity.

In a fully retroactive application of a new rule, the decision applies to the parties of the case in which the new rule is pronounced,
and to all issues subsequently coming before the court "regardless
of the chronology of the factual events from which the legal rights
'56
and liabilities at issue arose."
By overruling a law on a purely prospective basis, the court applies the old law to all claims based on acts or transactions occurring
clear departure from prior precedent, prospective application will ordinarily be favored.
Fifth, the more radically the new decision departs from previous substantive law, the greater
the need for limiting retroactivity. Finally, this Court will also look to the precedent of
other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective question in the same area
of the law in their overruling decisions.
Id. at 880-81, syl. pt. 5.
50. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2443-44
54. Id. at 2444.
55. Id. Several commentators have noted a fourth alternative of applying a new rule: the Prospective-Prospective method. The effect of such a judicial mechanism is that the new law is applied
to claims arising at some future date. In other words, the new rule of law does not go into effect
the moment it is announced as in pure prospectivity. Instead, the court postpones the rule's effective
date under the assumption that, in the meantime, the legislature will take this opportunity to examine
the new rule and make any necessary changes before the new rule's effective date. See, DeLong,
supra note 29, at 127; Note, Prospective Application of JudicialDecisions, 33 ALA. L. REv. 463,
475 (1982). In all due respect to the commentators, as the United States Supreme Court in Beam did
not recognize the Prospective-Prospective method as an alternative application of a new rule of law,
discussion of such a method will be limited to this footnote.
56. S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision,
10 A.L.R.3D 1371, 1382 (1966).
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before the announcement of the new decision. 7 Accordingly, the old
law is applied to the parties of the case in which the new rule is
promulgated. The new rule is then applied to all claims grounded
on acts or transactions occurring after the new law is announced.5
By giving a new rule a selectively prospective effect, the court
applies the "new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then
returns to the old [rule] with respect to all others arising on facts
predating the pronouncement." 59 However, a fundamental component of the rule of law, in general, and stare decisis, in specific, is
that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same. 60 In
light thereof, selective prospectivity as a choice of law has been
abandoned in the criminal context. 6' In a criminal case the new rule
is to be applied retroactively to all cases, even when the new rule
overturns precedent. 62 Additionally, it appears selective prospectivity
has never been applied or endorsed in the civil context.
IV.

JAMES B. BEAM DISTI'LING Co. v. GEoRGiA

Prior to James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,64 when the
Chevron analysis favored prospectivity, a court could still give their
decision retroactive effect. 6 Justice Souter, however, in the plurality's opinion in Beam, asserted that the Beam decision "does limit
the possible application of the Chevron... analysis, however irrelevant Chevron ... may otherwise be to this case." 66 Although

57. Note, supra note 55, at 470.
58. Thomas J. Dufour, Note, The ProperApplication of JudicialDecisions Overruling Established Tort Doctrines, 65 B.U. L. REv. 315, 325 (1985).
59. Beam, I11 S. Ct. at 2444. Selective prospectivity has been called "partial prospectivity"
and/or "quasi-prospectivity" by some commentators. See Dufour, supra note 58, at 329 ("Partial
prospective application involves application of the new rule only to cases arising after the overruling
decision, except that the decision is applied to the parties involved in the overruling case."); DeLong,
supra note 29, at 127 ("Quasi-prospective overruling applies a new decision to all claims arising after
the date of the new decision. Unlike the pure prospectivity method, however, the new rule also applies
retroactively to the parties to the overruling decision.").
60. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDIcIA

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

DEcIsIoN 70 (1961).

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
Id.
Beam, I11 S. Ct. at 2445
111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
DeLong, supra note 29, at 124.
Id.
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the Beam Court neglected to perform the Chevron analysis, it was
not the first time the Supreme Court has made this blunder. In fact,
in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,6 7 the case upon which the Beam
plurality based their decision, the Chevron test was also not ap8
plied. 6
An understanding of the holding, reasoning, and dissention in
69
Beam begins with a brief analysis of Bacchus.
A.

PrecedentialBackground
In 1939 Hawaii enacted a liquor tax that imposed a six percent
levy on the sale or use of alcoholic beverages at the retail level.70
Its purpose was to defray the cost of certain governmental services,
such as law enforcement which, according to the Hawaii Legislature,
had increased due to an escalation in the consumption of liquor. 7'
Since the inception of the Hawaii liquor tax, the Legislature has
systematically shifted its incidence from the retailers to the wholesalers by increasing its rate from six percent to a current level of
twenty percent of the wholesale price. 72 In an attempt to encourage
the development of the Hawaiian liquor industry, 73 the Legislature
enacted an exemption for okolehao from May 1971 until June 1981, 74
and an exemption for fruit wine from May 1976 until June 1981. 7
The constitutionality of these exemptions were challenged by
Bacchus Imports, Ltd., Paradise Beverages, Inc., Eagle Distributors,
Inc., and Foremost-McKesson, Inc. (Bacchus, Paradise, Eagle, and
McKesson, respectively, and the wholesalers, collectively). 76 All were
licensed as wholesale liquor dealers under Hawaii's liquor control
laws. 77 In May 1987, Bacchus directed a letter to the State Director
67. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Beam, I11 S. Ct. at 2451.
Bacchus, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 656 P.2d 724, 727 (Haw. 1982).
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
Bacchus, 656 P.2d at 727.
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
HAw. REv. STAT. § 244-4(6) (Supp. 1983).

75. HAw. REv. STAT. § 244-4(7) (Supp. 1983).
76. Bacchus, 656 P.2d at 726.
77. Id. at 727-28.
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of Taxation protesting the excise tax assessed on its sale or use of
alcoholic beverages. 7 8 Subsequently, Bacchus filed a complaint pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute § 40-35. 79 Paradise, Eagle, and
McKesson quickly followed suit with their own protest letters to the
State Director of Taxation. Subsequently, each of these wholesalers
also initiated a refund action.80
The wholesalers alleged in their complaints that the liquor tax
82
8
contravened the Import-Export Clause ' and the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution. 83 The Tax Appeal Court rejected
these arguments, finding the tax scheme valid.84 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, the wholesalers forwarded an equal protection challenge.85 It, too, was rejected 6as the state court affirmed
8
the decision of the Tax Appeal Court.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the

Hawaii liquor tax exemption for okolehao and fruit wine had both
the purpose and the effect of discriminating in favor of locally pro-

duced beverages and, thus, violated the Commerce Clause. 87 By finding the Hawaii liquor tax exemptions unconstitutional, and thereby
reversing the Supreme Court of Hawaii,88 the issue of a proper remedy was raised.
It was the State of Hawaii's contention that even if the liquor
tax was unconstitutionally discriminatory, the wholesalers were not
entitled to refunds because the economic incidence of the tax was
78. Id. at 728.
79. HAW. REV. STAT. § 40-35 (Supp. 1975) "authorizes a taxpayer to pay taxes under protest
and to commence an action in the Tax Appeal Court for the recovery of the disputed sums." (Quoting
Bacchus, 656 P.2d at 728).
80. Bacchus, 656 P.2d at 728.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, states, in pertinent part: "No State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, lay any ... Duties on Imports or Exports."
82. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, states in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have power
... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States."
83. Bacchus, 656 P.2d at 728.
84. Id.
85. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 267. This argument was based on the wholesalers' claim that the
favored treatment of okolehao and other locally produced fruit wines denied the wholesalers equal
protection. Bacchus, 656 P.2d at 728.
86. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 267.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 277.
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passed on to their customers. 89 Since the tax was not borne by the
wholesalers, the State argued that the wholesalers endured no competitive injury. ° The wholesalers' asserted that, by virtue of the statute's unconstitutionality, the Commerce Clause required a refund
of the taxes collected under the liquor tax. 9'
The Supreme Court reached the issue by stating:
These refund issues, which are essentially issues of remedy for the imposition of
a tax that unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce, were not
addressed by the state courts. Also, the federal constitution issues involved may
well be intertwined with, or their consideration obviated by, issues of state law.
Also, resolution of those issues, if required at all, may necessitate more of a
record than so far has been made in this case. We are reluctant, therefore, to
address them in the first instance. 92

Accordingly, the case was remanded to Hawaii's state courts for
resolution of the issue of remedy. 93
B.

The Georgia Supreme Court's Holding

In Beam, the plaintiff, James B. Beam Distilling Co. filed an
action against the State of Georgia, seeking a refund for taxes paid
pursuant to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (hereinafter
OCGA) § 3-4-6014 for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. 91 This liquor
tax was very similar to the statute found unconstitutional in Bacchus.96 In 1985, shortly after the Bacchus ruling, the Georgia Legislature amended OCGA § 3-4-60, ridding the statute of its
unconstitutional qualities. 97 Consequently, only those taxes paid pursuant to the pre-1985 version of OCGA § 3-4-60 were at issue in
Beam. 98

89. Id.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
beverages
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-4-60 (Michie 1982) imposed an increased tax on imported alcoholic
as opposed to alcoholic beverages manufactured in the State of Georgia.
Beam, 382 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 95-96.

98. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Georgia found the purpose and the effect
of the pre-1985 version of OCGA § 3-4-60 was simple economic
protectionism and deemed the statute invalid under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution." The issue of refunds as
a remedy, however, was moot as the Supreme Court of Georgia
opted to apply the ruling prospectively only.10
The State Court employed the three-pronged analysis of
Chevron'01 in deciding the question of prospective or retroactive application of the decision.10 2 Employing the first prong of the Chevron
test, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that had the decision been
rendered prior to the 1985 amendment of OCGA §3-4-60, their ruling that the pre-1985 version of OCGA §3-4-60 was unconstitutional
would have established a new principle of law. 103 Accordingly, such
a decision would have overruled "past precedent on which [the]
litigants relied.'"04 Therefore, the first prong of the Chevron test
supported nonretroactive application of the rule. 05
The second prong of the Chevron test was not applicable because
the statute in question was amended in 19 85.106
The third prong of the Chevron test required the Supreme Court
of Georgia to balance the equities imposed by retroactive application
of the decision. 0 7 Beam asked the Court for a $2.4 million refund,
while other parties in pending lawsuits were seeking refunds totaling
8
over $28 million on the same grounds. 10
The Georgia Supreme Court
determined that retroactive application of their decision would impose a severe financial burden on the State of Georgia and its cit-

99. Id. at 96.

100. Id.
101. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).

102. Id.
103. Beam, 382 S.E.2d at 96.
104. Id. In Scott v. State, 2 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 1939) the pre-1985 version of GA. CODsE ANN. §
3-4-60 (1982) was challenged as being violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and the statute was upheld. The pre-1985 version was not challenged again until 1989 in
Beam. 382 S.E.2d at 96.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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izens, 109 reasoning that "[e]conomic realities lead to the inescapable
conclusion that the cost of this tax has or could have been already
absorbed by the companies and passed on to Georgia consumers.
Indeed, retroactive application of the ruling might well result in a
windfall to the alcohol producers."110
In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court of Georgia
decided that the Chevron analysis dictated that their decision was
to be applied prospectively.' Consequently, Beam was denied the
tax refund it sought.
C. The United States Supreme Court's Ruling
Beam sought, and was granted, a writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court."l2 The Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the
Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment was to be applied retroactively." 3 Ironically, the plurality paid no heed to the Chevron analysis but, yet, claimed to have based its decision on "principles of
equality and stare decisis. ' ' 1 4
1. The Plurality's Opinion
Justice Souter delivered the plurality's opinion, recalling that the
wholesalers in Bacchus, who prevailed on the merits of their Commerce Clause claim, were not granted outright their request for a
refund of the taxes paid under the liquor tax statute which was
ultimately found unconstitutional." 5 Instead, the Bacchus Court remanded the case to consider the issues of remedy, which had not
been decided by the state courts or adequately developed on the
record. 1 6 Justice Souter followed with the crux of the plurality's
opinion:

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 97.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
110 S. Ct. 2616 (1990).

113. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448. The case was remanded to determine the appropriate remedy.
Id.
114. Id. at 2451.
115. Id. at 2445.
116. Id.
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Bacchus is fairly read to hold as a choice of law that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court. Because the Bacchus opinion
did not reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties

before it, it is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive
application in civil cases. If the Court were to have found prospectivity as a choiceof-law matter, there would have been no need to consider the pass-through defense; if the Court had reserved the issue, the terms of the remand to consider
"remedial" issues would have been incomplete. Indeed, any consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies that the precedential question has been settled
to the effect that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the Court. Because

the Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for consideration of the passthrough defense, it thus should be read as having retroactively applied the rule
17
there decided. 1

The Bacchus decision came thirteen years after Chevron. 8 Regardless of the fact that the Bacchus Court neglected to perform
the Chevron three prong analysis (the performance of which would
have been based on "principles of equality and stare decisis"119),
the Supreme Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court was in
error for refusing to apply the precedent established in Bacchus in
Beam.120
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, noted that even if
the Bacchus Court was wrong in failing to perform the Chevron
analysis, "that is water over the dam, irretrievably it seems to me. 12 1
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, who wrote the dissenting opinion, noted that
all implications and assumptions aside, the Bacchus decision was
silent on the issue of retroactivity.122 By implicitly applying its rule
of law retroactively without performing the Chevron analysis (as
principles of equality and stare decisis dictate), Justice O'Connor
contended that the Bacchus Court erred. 23 Additionally, Justice
O'Connor noted that had the Bacchus Court performed the Chevron
117. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

118. Bacchus was decided in 1984 while Chevron was decided in 1971. See Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).

119. Beam, 11 S. Ct. at 2451.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 2448.

Id.
Id. at 2451.
Id.
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analysis, the Court would have decided that the rule should have
been applied prospectively only. t24 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor
stated that "[i]f retroactive application was inequitable in Bacchus
itself, the [Beam] Court only hinders the cause of fairness by repeating the mistake."'' 2
V. THE PASs-ON DEFENSE
The pass-on defense may be employed by one who has wrongly
received money from another. This typically occurs in a marketplace setting. Very simply, the recipient asserts that the payor recouped the money paid by increasing the cost of the goods or services sold to subsequent purchasers. Accordingly, the recipient argues
that it is the subsequent purchaser who bore the cost of the amount
wrongly paid by the payor, and any recovery by the payor would
amount to a windfall. This part of the Note analyzes the development of the pass-on defense, its theoretical foundation, its successes and failures, and its potential for future application.
West Virginia's refund statute reads in pertinent part: "In the
case of overpayment of any tax ... imposed by this article ... the
tax commissioner shall ... refund to the taxpayer the amount of

the overpayment .... "126 Clearly, there is no statutory limitation
of refund claims. Despite this, questions have been raised as to
whether a state with such a statute will be allowed to refund something less than the full overpayment. This objective can most easily
be achieved by the judicial recognition of the pass-on defense.
The recent popularity of the pass-on defense has made the issue
of remedies for the payment of unconstitutional taxes more complex.
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the measure of the appropriate remedy has been cast in some degree of doubt.
A.

A Taxpayer's Right to a Refund
At common law, courts would not order a refund to one who
voluntarily' 27 paid an unconstitutional tax, even when the taxpayer
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2452.
126. W. VA. CoDE § 11-10-14 (1978).

127. "In order for a payment of taxes to be deemed involuntary, there must be some actual or
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did not have knowledge of the law's unconstitutionality.1 28 The state
governments, too, were slow to open their treasuries and refund
monies already held in their vaults.1 29 To do so, it was reasoned,
would undermine the states' ability to conduct its affairs since the
state had used or had budgeted to use all of the taxes collected or
expected to be collected in the current year. 13 0 Refunds could seriously impair the states' ability to effectively and efficiently conduct
its business. 3 One court noted that
unless a contrary conclusion was forced by an ironclad statute, no taxpayer should
have the right to disrupt the government by demanding a refund of his money,
whether paid legally or otherwise, unless the sovereign was made to know at the
time the money was paid that the taxpayer would insist that the money should
be refunded to him.'

32

Absent a specific statutory remedy providing for a refund of state
taxes, states generally will not recognize any right to a refund beyond
those of the common law. 3 3 Thus, under most circumstances, absent
a statute stating otherwise, illegally collected taxes are not recovered
by the taxpayer unless the taxes were paid under compulsion or
duress, or, in some cases, under protest. 34 Fortunately, many states
regulate by statute the right to recover a refund for taxes paid pursuant to an unconstitutional tax scheme,"3 5 even when the tax was
3 6
paid voluntarily or made without protest.

threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed, by the party exacting or receiving
the payment over the person or property of the party making the payment, from which the latter
has no reasonable means of immediate relief except by making payment." When May Payment of
Tax or Assessment Be Regarded as Involuntary or Made Under Duress, 64 A.L.R. 9, 13 (1929). See
72 AM. Jug.. 2d State and Local Taxation § 1081 (1974).
128. Tatarowicz, supra note 3, at 120. See Coleman v. Inland Gas Corp., 21 S.W.2d 1030 (Ky.
1929); 72 AM. JuR. 2d State and Local Taxation § 1087 (1974).
129. Coleman, 21 S.W.2d at 1031.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Tatarowicz, supra note 3, at 125-26.
134. Oliver P. Field, The Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes, 45 HAsv. L. Rv.
501, 511 (1931).
135. Tatarowicz, supra note 3, at 125.
136. 72 Am. Jupt. 2d State and Local Taxation § 1074 (1974). See W. VA. CODE § 11-10-14
(1978), which states, in pertinent part: "In the case of overpayment of any tax, . . . the tax commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of this article, refund to the taxpayer the amount of the
overpayment ....
.
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As a general rule, a taxpayer must show that he bore the burden
of the tax before being authorized a refund. 3 7 Such a showing is
necessary because a refund procedure without this safeguard might
result in the unjust enrichment of the taxpayer.' This equitable
principle is a natural breeding ground for the pass-on defense.
In Bacchus, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of the
pass-on defense, although the Supreme Court did not validate its
application in tax refund actions. 13 9 As discussed above, in Bacchus
the Supreme Court found that the wholesalers had paid taxes pursuant to an unconstitutional tax scheme. 40 As to the wholesalers'
remedy, the State of Hawaii argued that the wholesalers did not
bear the cost of the tax and, instead, their customers absorbed the
tax in the form of higher prices. 141 Accordingly, the State argued
42
that any refund to the wholesalers would be, in effect, a windfall.
The State of Hawaii, where Bacchus originated, statutorily recog43
nized a taxpayer's right to a refund.
Despite Hawaii's statutes recognizing a right to a refund, the
Bacchus Court declined to rule whether the wholesalers were entitled
to a refund. 144 The Supreme Court remanded and ruled: "These
refund issues, which are essentially issues of remedy for the imposition of a tax that unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce, were not addressed by the state courts ....

are reluctant, therefore, to address them in the first instance."'

We
4

The Supreme Court did not reject the pass-on defense outright
and its potential for future application has caused much speculation.
Accordingly, one must gain an understanding of the pass-on defense
before engaging in tax refund litigation involving a commercial entity.

137. United States v. Jefferson Electric Manufacturing Co., 291 U.S. 386, 391 (1934).
138. Consolidated Distilled Products v. Mahin, 306 N.E.2d 465, 469 (Ill.
1973).
139. 468 U.S. 263, 277 (1984).

140. Id.at 273.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 276-77.
Id.
Bacchus, 656 P.2d 724, 728 (1982).
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 277.

145. Id.
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B. Development of the Pass-On Defense
The laws of restitution require that "a person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another [be] required to make
restitution to that other." 146 For instance, if a defendant illegally
takes a plaintiff's property, restitution requires that the defendant
return the plaintiff's property. "The intuitive appeal of restitution
is that, by reversing the unlawful taking, a court can divest an unjust
gain and replace the plaintiff's loss . . "147 Complications arise,
however, when this analysis incorporates a third party. The following illustrates such a situation.
As a matter of economic survival, the price a business attempts
to sell its product or service is driven by, to a large degree, the
expenses the business incurs. Businesses are apt to contend with new
expenses, including taxes, as another cost of commerce. 14 Such costs
49
will be included in the price a business charges for its product.1
Accordingly, the successful business is able to, in an indirect manner,
recover the new expense from its customers. The "pass-on" doctrine
asks the question: "If that is the case, who has been injured by the
new expense: the business or the customer?"' 50
1. Defensive Use in Antitrust Suits
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the "passon" defense on relatively narrow grounds in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 5 ' Hanover was a shoe manufacturer
and a customer of United, a shoe machinery manufacturer and distributor. 5 2 Hanover filed an antitrust action against United under
§ 4 of the Sherman Act because United would only lease, rather
than sell, its major machines to Hanover. 5 3 The District Court found

146. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTON § 1 (1937).

147. Woodward, supra note 21, at 874.
148. Id. at 878-79.
149. Id.
150. Steven C. Babb, Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the PassingOn Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 98 (1972).
151. 392 U.S. 481, 487 (1968).
152. Id. at 483.
153. Id.
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this monopolization to be illegal and determined Hanover's damages
to be the difference between what it paid United in shoe machine
rentals and what it would have paid had United been willing to sell
4
the machines. 1
United asserted that Hanover suffered no "legally cognizable injury," alleging that the illegal overcharge was reflected in the price
of their shoes.' 55 Additionally, United claimed that had Hanover
purchased the machines, Hanover would have lowered their price
by the amount of savings realized from buying rather than leasing
the shoe machines. 5 6 Thus, United contended Hanover's profit would
have been exactly the same. 57
The Supreme Court rejected United's defense, which was purported to be grounded in the laws of economics, 58 for three reasons.
First, the Court noted that "[tihe general tendency of the law, in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step ....
[The plaintiff's] claim accrued at once in the theory of the law and
it does not inquire into later events."'5 9
Second, the Supreme Court decided that it was extremely improbable, if not impossible, for a court of law to accurately deterrline, after the fact, how much of an effect one factor had on
the company's net profits.'16 The Court recognized that numerous
factors influence a company's pricing strategy.' 61 Accordingly,
"[s]ince establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense would
require a convincing showing of ...

these virtually unascertainable

figures, the task [of determining how much of the overcharge was
passed on] would normally prove insurmountable."' 62 The Court
noted that if the pass-on defense was confirmed, the use of the
154. Id. at 484.

155. Id. at 487-88.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 492.
159. Id. at 490 n.8 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S.
531 (1918)).
160. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493.
161. Id.
162. Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss4/12

20

Rollo: The Refund of Taxes Paid Pursuant to an Unconstitutional Tax Sche
TAX REFUNDS

1992]

1125

defense would undoubtedly place a massive burden on the judicial

system. 163
Finally, the third rationale for rejecting the pass-on defense was
that antitrust actions would be rendered ineffective to a large degree.164 The Court noted:
[I]f buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense, those who buy from them
would also have to meet the challenge that they passed on the higher price to
their customers. These ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of single
pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in
attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws
illegality because
by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their
6
no one was available who would bring suit against them.' '

2.

Offensive Use in Antitrust Suits

The Supreme Court, In Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois,'6
had the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the offensive assertion
of the pass-on defense by a third party purchaser. Illinois Brick
manufactured and distributed concrete block in the Greater Chicago
area, selling the concrete blocks to masonry contractors who had
submitted bids to general contractors.' 67 These same general contractors, in turn, submitted bids to customers such as the State of
Illinois. 68 The concrete blocks passed through two separate levels
69
of distribution before reaching the State of Illinois.
The State brought an antitrust action, alleging that Illinois Brick
engaged in a "combination and conspiracy to fix the prices of concrete block in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."' 70 The State
of Illinois alleged that the price it paid for the concrete block was
more than $3 million higher as a direct result of Illinois Brick's
price-fixing scheme.'17 The State argued that at least part of the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.at 494.
Id.
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Id.at 726.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 727
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illegal overcharges were not absorbed by the first two levels of dis72
tribution but, rather, passed on to the State of Illinois.
The Supreme Court first considered whether to recognize this
offensive use of the pass-on defense while continuing to allow the
defensive use of the pass-on defense (as established in Hanover
Shoe'7), provided the direct and indirect purchasers were not suing
the defendant in the same case.1 74 This consideration was rejected
for two reasons.175 First, by allowing the offensive use of the passon defense in addition to the defensive use, the defendants would
be exposed to multiple liability. The Court noted that "overlapping
recoveries are certain to result from the two lawsuits unless the indirect purchaser is unable to establish any pass-on whatsoever.' '1 76
Second, "the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved
in the defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are multiplied in the offensive use of pass-on by a plaintiff several steps
removed from the defendant in the chain of distribution.' 77 Such
proceedings would greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness
7
of the judicial system. 1
Upon determining that a finding in favor of the State of Illinois
(and thereby an affirmance of the offensive use of the pass-on defense) could not coincide with the rule in Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court was faced with the choice of overruling or at least
narrowly limiting the Hanover Shoe decision, or denying the offensive use of the pass-on defense. 179 The Supreme Court opted the
former.
The Illinois Brick Court conceded that the Hanover Shoe rule
could possibly deny recovery to indirect purchasers who had actually
been injured. 80 However, the Court reasoned that the legislative pur172. Id.
173. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
174. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730.

175. Id.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

730-31.
732.
736.
746.
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pose of the antitrust law under § 4 of the Sherman Act "is better
served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent
of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to apportion
the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it." ''
3. Defensive Use in Actions for Tax Refunds
In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages,8 2 the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to explain a state's obligation
to provide retroactive relief and to analyze the applicability of the
pass-on defense. Until 1985, Florida's liquor excise tax scheme provided rate reductions to manufacturers, distributors, and, in some
cases, vendors of alcoholic beverages that were manufactured from
certain "Florida-grown" citrus and other agricultural crops, and then
bottled in Florida. 8 3 On the heels of Bacchus,84 which found a similar levy unconstitutional, the Florida Legislature made cosmetic
changes to the tax scheme. 85 However, these changes did not effect
86
the tax substantially. 1
McKesson, a licensed wholesale distributor of alcoholic beverages, did not qualify for the rate reduction. 87 In June 1986, McKesson
filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, and a refund on the
ground that the liquor tax was unconstitutional as being violative
of the Commerce Clause. 88 In the meantime, McKesson continued
to make the monthly tax payment pursuant to the statute.8 9 Although the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that the liquor tax was
unconstitutional, the court opted to apply the ruling prospectively. 90
The state court reasoned that "[n]ot only was the tax preference
scheme implemented ...

in good faith ...

if given a refund

181. Id.
182. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
183. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 524 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 1989).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 564.06 & 564.12 (West Supp. 1984).
184. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
185. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 564.06 & 565.12 (West 1985).
186. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2243.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. McKesson, 524 So. 2d at 1010.
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[McKesson] would in all probability receive a windfall, since the
cost of the tax has likely been passed on to their customers."' 19
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
states to provide procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions. 92
A state need not provide predeprivation safeguards; 193 indeed, a state
may utilize various sanctions and summary remedies to persuade
taxpayers to submit payments prior to resolution of the tax assessment dispute. 194 Florida, the Supreme Court noted, employed these
tactics so that liquor distributors would make timely payments before their protests were heard and resolved. 195 In such a case, it may
be said that the tax was paid under duress "in the sense that the
State has not provided the taxpayer with a fair and meaningful predeprivation procedure."' 196 The Supreme Court held the following:
To satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, therefore, in this refund

action the State must provide the taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to
challenge the accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also "a clear

and certain remedy" for any erroneous or unlawful tax collection to ensure that
2
the opportunity to contest the tax is a meaningful one. '9

Such a requirement imposed a duty on Florida to provide relief
to McKesson, ranging from refunding the difference between the tax
it paid and the amount it would have paid had McKesson been
extended the same rate reductions that its competitors received, to
levying an offsetting charge to previously favored distributors. 198 "The
State is free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long
as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements.' ' 199

191. Id.
192. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2250-51. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976);
Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 138-42 (1907); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1878).
193. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746 (1974).
194. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
195. Id.at 2251.
196. Id. at 2251 n.21. United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 368 (173); Ward
v. Love County Board of Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 23 (1924); Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 233
U.S. 468, 471 (1912).
197. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2251.
198. Id. at 2252.
199. Id. at 2258
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As the State Court called for prospective application of its ruling,
the State Court did not discuss the merits of the pass-on defense,
although stating that if McKesson were authorized a refund, such
a refund would represent a windfall for McKesson "since the cost
of the tax has likely been passed on to their customers. ' 20 0 The
Supreme Court found this statement to be pure speculation, and
recognized that determining how much of a particular cost is passed
on to the next level in the chain of distribution requires a "highly
sophisticated theoretical and factual inquiry.''201 It appears that the
Supreme Court has left the door open for those asserting the passon defense.
However, the Supreme Court noted that any benefit McKesson
received by successfully passing the unconstitutional portion of the
liquor tax to its customers was most likely negated by a loss in sales
due to its higher sales price or by having to incur other costs (e.g.,
advertising) in an effort to maintain its market share. 20 2 This passon of the tax "furthers the very competitive disadvantage constituting the Commerce Clause violation that rendered the deprivation
unlawful in the first place.''203
C. Tax Incidence Analysis
Tax incidence analysis is the study of who bears the burden of
a particular tax. 204 "The ability of the intermediate purchaser to pass
the added burden down the distributive chain will depend greatly
upon the relative elasticities of supply and demand for his product,
that is, the responsiveness to price changes of quantities supplied
and demanded. ' 205 "The standard formula used for computing cost
absorption by firms in an industry is given by dividing the absolute

200. McKesson, 524 So. 2d at 1010.
201. McKEsson, 110 S. Ct. at 2255.
202. Id. at 2256.
203. Id. The Supreme Court noted that even if such an unconstitutional tax scheme were to
drive a business out of the market, the State's obligation under the Due Process Clause may be limited
to providing the taxpayer a refund of the excess taxes collected under the illegal scheme. Id. at 2256
n.33.
204. Elmer J. Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 16 NV?. & MARY L. REv. 883, 887 (1975).
205. Id.
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value of the price elasticity of demand206 by the sum of the absolute
values of the price elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of
supply."2 0 7 This can be expressed by the equation:
A=

Ed
Ed + Es

where:
A = Absorption of a cost of increase by a firm
Ed = Change in quantity demanded given a change in price
208
Es = Change in quantity supplied given a change in price
Incidence analysis is an accepted method of approximating how
much of a new tax is passed on to consumers who demand the
product, provided one is able to ascertain the elasticities of supply
and demand of the product in question. 20 9 Unfortunately, accurately
determining these elasticities is a difficult task since there is no method
that will measure them directly. 210 Consequently, the elasticities of
supply and demand for other products must be measured and then
employed to estimate the elasticities for the product in question.21 '
In the mid-1980's the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA)
was given the task of determining who bore the impact of certain
crude oil overcharges. 21 2 Among the marginal economic analyses employed in making the determination was the incidence analysis described above.2 13 The OHA concluded that these analyses, which
rested upon assumptions and estimations, provided the best possible
indication of the extent to which the domestic crude oil refining
industry bore the impact of the overcharges. z 4
206. The price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in the quantity demand
for a given percentage change in price. Lobel, supra note 14, at 583 n.27.
207. See CCH Federal Energy Guidelines 90,507 & 90,631 (1985) (Stripper Well Litigation).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The Dept. of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litigation, M.D.L. 378 (D. Kansas)
213. CCH Federal Energy Guidelines 90,631 (1985).
214. Id. at 90,639.
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Although the economic analyses were able to accurately estimate
the extent of the rise in prices when the refining industry experienced
a small crude oil cost increase, the OHA found that the analyses
did not provide insight as to how much of the cost was incurred
by any particular firm.2 15 To ascertain the extent to which a particular refiner passed on the impact of the overcharges, the OHA
noted that "a number of factors specific to the operations of that
refiner must be analyzed.' '216 Unfortunately, the OHA stated that
"no methodology that would accomplish analyses of these factors"
was known, "and21 7 no party in this proceeding has suggested such
a methodology."
VI.

CONCLUSION

In James B. Distilling Co. v. Georgia, the United States Supreme

Court ruled that when taxpayers pay taxes pursuant to an unconstitutional tax scheme, they are entitled to some form of retroactive
relief. The Beam Court, however, left the responsibility of determining what relief is appropriate to the state courts.
Prior to Beam, courts applied the three prong analysis developed
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson to determine whether a tax ruling
adverse to a state on constitutional grounds should be applied prospectively or retroactively. The Chevron analysis took into consideration, among other things, the inequity imposed on a state by a
retroactive application of the ruling. Accordingly, prior to Beam,
if the issuance of a refund in a case where a tax scheme was unconstitutional would place a state in a dire financial condition, the
court could apply its ruling prospectively. This would have the effect
of denying the taxpayer a refund. With Beam, courts have no such
prerogative and must apply these types of tax rulings retroactively.
With little hope of curtailing the economic disaster that could
result from a large, mandatory tax refund, the states will probably
assert the pass-on defense. The pass-on defense has been discredited
for many reasons - the most important arguably being that it is
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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too difficult, if not impossible, to prove what amount of the tax
was passed on to consumers. Consequentially, the pass-on defense
will provide the states little or no help, and the states will probably
be forced to provide full tax refunds.
In the shadow of more prominent social and political issues that
have appeared in the national headlines, have determined political
elections, and have divided the courts, the Beam decision, by way
of its financial impact, may silently have the most significant effect
on us all.
Edmund J. Rollo
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